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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
TORTS-LIABILITY OF JOINT TORT-FEASORS-Water from the
slush pits on defendants' drilling rig inundated plaintiff's land
causing considerable damage. Defendants contended, inter alia,
that some of the water had come from another oil company's rig
and from the tanks of the municipal water company and for this
reason the plaintiff's injury could not be chargeable entirely to
them. Held, that even if defendants' contentions were correct
they could not escape liability for the entire damage because at
best they were joint tort-feasors and as such were liable in
solido.1 Eagen v. Tri-State Oil Co., 183 So. 124 (La. App. 1938).
In the common law states as well as in Louisiana it is well
established that joint tort-feasors are liable in solido.2 The real
problem is presented by the question: Who are joint tort-feasors?
The courts have given conflicting answers to this question. Ac-
cording to English common law, defendants in a tort action could
not be joined unless they were joint tort-feasors, and only those
who had acted in concert were considered as such." The early
American cases followed this rule.' When the various states
adopted code pleading, however, parties who had not acted in
concert (but whose concurrent acts had united to cause the dam-
age) could be joined in the same action. They were inadvertently
called "joint tort-feasors" and held liable in solido through the
failure of the courts to distinguish between procedural law and
substantive liability.5 This explains in part the lack of complete
uniformity.
At present the majority of courts follow the rule that, in the
absence of concert of action, defendants are liable in solido only
in the following situations: (1) where the act of either would
have caused the entire damage independently of the other," (2)
where the act of neither would have caused any damage in the
1. Art. 2324, La. Civil Code of 1870: "He who causes another person to do
an unlawful act, or assists or encourages in the commission of it, is answer-
able, in solido, with that person, for the damage caused by such act." (Note
that this article seems to contemplate concert of action.)
2. Salmond, Torts (6 ed. 1924) 83.
3. Thompson v. The London County Council, [1899] 1 Q. B. 840 (defendant
excavated near plaintiff's house and damage was caused when the water com-
pany left their water main partly open).
4. Buddington v. Shearer, 37 Mass. 477 (1838); Little Schuylkill Naviga-
tion, Railroad, and Coal Co. v. Richards, 57 Pa. 142, 98 Am. Dec. 209 (1868)
(defendants threw dirt and coal dust into a stream causing damage to plain-
tiff's dam).
5. See Prosser, Joint Torts and Several Liability (1937) 25 Calif. L. Rev.
413, and authorities cited.
6. Anderson v. Minneapolis St. P. & S. S. M. Ry. Co., 146 Minn. 430, 179
N.W. 45 (1920); Harper, Torts (1933) 677, § 302, and cases cited.
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absence of the other's wrongdoing.7 An analysis of the cases shows
that in holding such defendants liable in solido the courts arrive
at essentially the same result that they would have accomplished
under the old common law rule where the question of solidary
liability was not considered. In both of the above situations, if
each defendant had been sued individually for his separate act,
he would have been liable for the entire damage. Since this is
likewise the consequence of solidary liability, the results for
practical purposes are the same.
In the first situation (where the act of either would have
caused the entire damage), it is obvious that neither can escape
liability for the entire damage because each caused the entire
damage. What the courts call solidary liability under this state of
facts is nothing other than concurrent liability.8 The reason given
for holding the defendants liable in solido is that if one escaped
solidary liability the other would, with equal reason, escape such
liabilityY This reason lacks cogency since solidary liability has
no application where the act of one defendant caused all the
damage.
In the second situation (where the act of neither was alone
sufficient to cause the damage), solidary liability is imposed to
escape a paradox for, since the act of each caused no harm by it-
self, it is impossible to attribute to any defendant his propor-
tionate share of liability. If one defendant were allowed to escape
liability because his act alone could not have caused any damage,
each defendant would escape for the same reason and the injured
party would have no remedy. To cut the Gordian knot, the courts
impose solidary liability upon each defendant. 10
Where the act of each party would have caused some damage
in the absence of the act of the other, there does not exist any
valid reason for imposing solidary liability. It cannot be said that
defendants are concurrently liable for the whole damage because
7. Washington & Georgetown Railroad Co. v. Hickey, 166 U.S. 521, 17 S.Ct.
661, 41 L.Ed. 1101 (1897); Citizens Telephone Co. v. Prickett, 189 Ind. 141, 125
N.E. 193 (1919); Johnson v. Northwestern Telephone Exchange Co., 48 Minn.
433, 51 N.W. 225 (1892) (one defendant maintained an unsafe pole, the other
cut the guy wire).
8. The Koursk [1924] P. 140, 150. "It is no doubt quite common to speak of
each of separate tort-feasors as joint tort-feasors in the sense that where
each has contributed to the- injury complained of, each is liable for the whole
of the damage done. In my opinion the use of the expression in such circum-
stances is inaccurate and misleading."
9. Anderson v. Minneapolis St. P. & S. S. M. Ry. Co., 146 Minn. 430, 179
N.W. 45 (1920).
10. Washington & Georgetown Ry. Co. v. Hickey, 166 U.S. 521, 17 S.Ct.
661, 41 L.Ed. 1101 (1897).
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neither caused the whole. Nor can it be said that liability must
be imposed upon both to prevent a complete escape by each one.
Liability may be imposed upon one for the damage he actually
caused, without in any way affecting the liability of the other
who is likewise responsible for his share. The fact that the dam-
age may be difficult to apportion does not justify condemning a
defendant for more damage than he in fact caused. If there exists
even a theoretical basis for making an apportionment, this should
be done and each defendant held liable for his share. Such is the
rule of the majority of American courts.11
In French law, joint tort-feasors are liable in solido.12 But in
cases where the independent acts of each caused a portion of the
damage each is liable only for his share.1 3 Even when the de-
fendants have acted in concert, the liability will not be solidary
if the court can apportion the damages. 14 In fact the judgment
condemning the defendants solidarily may also apportion the
respective shares of responsibility.'0
For the broad principle enunciated in the instant case, the
court found its authority in Williams v. Pelican Natural Gas
Co., 6 where three different oil companies, by emptying salt water
into a stream which ran through plaintiff's land, had caused dam-
age to his timber and were held liable in solido. It is sub-
mitted that this decision is erroneous and should not have been
followed. The court should have undertaken to apportion the
damage among the several wrongdoers. Such a decision would
have been in, accord with French jurisprudence and with the
holdings of the vast majority of common law jurisdictions. More-
11. Masonite Corp. v. Burnham, 164 Miss. 840, 146 So. 292, 91 A.L.R. 752
(1933).
12. 2 Mazeaud, Responsabilit6 Civile (3 ed. 1939) 880, no 1944; 4 Aubry et
Rau, Cours de Droit Civil Frangais (5 ed. 1902) 33, no 298ter, note 14; 2 Plan-
iol, Trait6 Elmentaire de Droit Civil (10 ed. 1926) 315, no 900; 2 Colin et
Capitant, Cours Elmentaire de Droit Civil Frangais (8 ed. 1935) 395, no 421;
Cass. ch. req. 27 d~cembre 1921, Dalloz, 1922.1.109.
13. 2 Mazeaud, op. cit. supra note 12, at 885, no 1948; Cass. ch. civ. 31
d6cembre 1902, Dalloz,- 1903.1.126.
14. Cass. ch. civ. 15 juillet 1895, Dalloz, 1896.1.31,32: "Whereas it does not
suffice, in order that solidarity be pronounced in a case of responsibility re-
sulting from a quasi-delict, that the fault be declared common to a certain
number of defendants; [that] it must in addition be established that this
fault is in such a manner indivisible that any division between those who
have committed it is impossible;-whereas the judgment under attack not only
does not establish that impossibility, but from the terms used it appears that
responsibility was deemed susceptible of being divided and apportioned ac-
cording to the part each one of the co-authors had had in the common fault."
(Translation supplied.)
15. Cass. ch. req. 5 juillet 1926, Dalloz, Ueb. 1926.1.401.
16. 187 La. 462, 175 So. 28 (1937).
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over, in view of the fact that, in Louisiana, joint tort-feasors are
not entitled to contribution unless they be co-judgment debtors,'7
such a disposition of the case would appear to be more equitable.
Nevertheless, some justification may be found for the court's de-
cision in that apportionment often works hardship on the inno-
cent injured party. This is particularly true where one or more
of the defendants is financially irresponsible.18 Equitable loss dis-
tribution, while it is ideal, is nevertheless a very difficult and
complex matter.
H.B.
17. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. DeJean, 185 La. 1074, 171 So. 450 (1936), noted
in (1938) 1 LOUISIANA LAW RsvImw 235.
18. See Prosser, supra note 6; Gregory, Loss Distribution by Comparative
Negligence (1936) 21 Minn. L. Rev. 1; Gregory, Legislative Loss Distribution
in Negligence Actions (1935), cited in Cowan, The Riddle of the Palsgraf
Case (1938) 23 Minn. L. Rev. 46.
